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he past few weeks have marked a shift of gear in EU antitrust enforcement. First, the 
new European Commissioner for Competition Margarethe Vestager announced on 
April 15th that the Commission had sent a Statement of Objections to Google, arguing 
that the giant IT company abused its dominant position in the “general Internet search” 
market and also in the market for mobile operating systems, apps and services. Exactly one 
week later, she also sent a Statement of Objections to Gazprom for having created artificial 
barriers to trade between certain EU countries, preventing gas flows and competition across 
national borders and charging unfair prices in five Central and Eastern European countries. 
It is indeed hard to recall any other time in which two investigations of this size – both 
potentially leading to billions of euros of fines – have been launched almost simultaneously. 
And commentators have also observed that both cases deal with non-EU companies and 
have been ongoing for several years before the Statements of Objections were actually filed. 
All this is happening at a time in which the European Commission, under the leadership of 
Jean Claude Juncker, is targeting the digital single market and the energy sector with large-
scale industrial policy initiatives such as the new Digital Single Market Strategy, the Energy 
Union and of course the Juncker Plan. Does this signal that the European Commission is 
promoting a revival of protectionism, by using competition law as a sword against non-EU 
firms?  
Let’s look at the facts first. In the case of Google, for more than four years, the previous 
Competition Commissioner Joaquim Almunia had tried to settle the case with the IT 
company, by asking it to offer commitments that would mitigate the Commission’s concerns 
and then testing them with Google’s market rivals. All attempts to settle the case have failed, 
notwithstanding repeated rounds of commitments presented by Google, some of which 
would have led to a major redesign of its search page to accommodate the results of 
competing vertical search providers. Four years down the road, only a subset of the early 
allegations formulated by Almunia seems to have survived in the Statement of Objections 
presented by the Commission, although the Commissioner has not excluded a broadening of 
the investigation. Ms Vestager, at least for now, is “only” accusing Google of having 
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awarded preferential treatment to its own online comparison shopping service, to the 
detriment of competing services. By exploiting its very large share of the general search 
market, Google has thus allegedly leveraged its market power into a neighbouring market, 
thus foreclosing competitors from such market and thwarting competition on the merits.  
In the case of Gazprom, things are even more serious, as the Commissioner argued that, 
based on preliminary evidence, “Gazprom’s overall strategy is abusive”. The giant gas 
company is accused of having partitioned the EU Single Market, through different territorial 
restrictions, including in contracts with its customers and also through other measures. 
Abusive conduct includes cases in which contracts prohibited Gazprom customers from re-
exporting gas into other Member states; unfair (exploitative) pricing of gas in at least five 
member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland); and making gas supplies to 
Poland (concerning the Yamal-pipeline) and to Bulgaria (concerning the South-Stream 
pipeline) conditional on obtaining unrelated commitments from wholesalers concerning gas-
transport infrastructure. As reported by the European Commission in its quarterly report on 
European Gas Markets, Gazprom’s gas prices significantly differ from country to country 
(for instance Lithuania paid 90% more than the Czech Republic in the first half of 2014)1. This 
difference might result from: 1) different pricing formulae reflecting different market 
conditions and/or 2) the misuse of pricing formulae by Gazprom (for instance by resisting 
pressures to modify them in line with changing market realities, such as hub prices).   
The two ‘Big Gs’ will now have the last chance to put forward their counter-arguments 
before the Commission takes a decision, arguably before the summer break. Both have 
rejected all allegations, claiming that they have been acting in conformity with EU rules. But 
the European Commission has never really changed its mind on any Article 102 TFEU case, 
nor has it ever accepted any counter-argument based on the efficiency of specific conduct, 
and seems unlikely to do so now. Accordingly, there are strong reasons to expect that both 
will receive heavy sanctions in a few weeks’ time.  
But will these sanctions be truly based on competition law decisions? Or industrial policy 
decisions? 
As a matter of fact, those who want to see, behind the two antitrust investigations, the very 
visible hand of government industrial policy will have abundant evidence to cite. In the case 
of Google, it is difficult to disentangle the current investigation from a number of recent 
events, which can only be briefly outlined in this commentary. Since last year, French and 
German institutions have repeatedly called on the European Commission to take action to 
split Google into two companies, as the European Parliament also recommended in 
November of last year. Second, the newly launched Digital Single Market strategy of the 
European Commission contains several provisions that are officially motivated by the need 
to reduce the power of the so-called “Internet monopolies”, starting with Google. Third, the 
French telecoms regulator has vigorously called for legislation that would impose neutrality 
obligations on large Internet platforms, starting obviously with Google but then reaching all 
the so-called GAFTAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Microsoft). And the 
European Commission has now launched a sector inquiry into e-commerce, mostly focusing 
on whether large companies like Amazon are creating artificial barriers that prevent 
Europeans from buying goods from other member states. Not to mention ongoing tax 
investigations and allegations of privacy violation being charged against Facebook, Amazon, 
Apple and others. Even President Barack Obama joined the chorus a few weeks ago by 
explicitly stating that Europe seems to be behaving strategically against US tech giants, 
                                                   
1 Special thanks go to CEPS Research Assistant Gergely Molnar for providing this information. 
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strangely enough as the two blocs are now negotiating a comprehensive free trade 
agreement (the TTIP).  
For what concerns Gazprom, many have noticed that the Statement of Objections reached the 
Russian company’s CEO when he was visiting Athens, and possibly offering Greece a key 
role in the Turkish Stream pipeline and potentially easing some of the pressure put on 
Greece by the Troika. Others have voiced the view that the investigation and the likely multi-
billion euro fine adds to the already conspicuous sanctions imposed on Russia since the 
beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. Indeed, Gazprom has been under observation for its 
contractual practices in Eastern Europe for more than a decade, and a formal investigation 
has been in place since 2012, but still the Statement of Objections reached the giant gas 
company just as the EU launched its ambitious Energy Union, and in the middle of one of 
the worst economic crises in the recent history of Russia, which is making Gazprom weaker 
than usual vis-à-vis its biggest client (the EU). 
The coming weeks will shed light on the real nature of these initiatives. To be sure, the two 
cases appear very different on their merits alone. On the one hand, there is amply 
documented, hardly surprising, almost ‘smoking gun’ evidence of Gazprom’s misconduct, 
and if anything this raises concerns about the timing of the investigation, rather than its 
merit. On the other hand, the Google investigation will force the Commission into a complex 
and controversial probe, in which antitrust principles are likely to be stretched beyond their 
original scope, and which will likely stimulate a lively debate on the role of antitrust in 
cyberspace in the coming years. Absent proof to the contrary, one would conclude that these 
are going to be pure, “technical” antitrust cases, with no contamination from other policy 
domains. An alternative interpretation is that the EU institutions are taking a tougher stance 
against any large company that attempts to partition the Single Market to maximise profit, 
whether in e-commerce, gas or any other sector. Finally, a third hypothesis, certainly more 
scary but often explicitly invoked by EU politicians, is that this is the beginning of a revival 
of protectionism, albeit masked as competition law enforcement. Place your bet: the jury is 
still out.  
